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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 2:37 am
Time: 2:37 am
Results for venue security
2 results foundAuthor: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Introduction It is the responsibility of both Government and private sector stakeholders to work collaboratively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of these incidents. Crowded places pose a broad range of security challenges for owners, operators and those responsible for providing a protective security overlay. They have been specifically identified - nationally and internationally - as attractive targets by those wishing to engage in terrorism, as well as disgruntled or mentally impaired individuals. Active armed offender attacks have occurred, and continue to occur, in crowded places around the world such as sporting stadiums, transport hubs and entertainment venues. Crowded places present a particularly attractive target for terrorism, due to the ready access to large numbers of potential victims. Attacks which occur in crowded places are particularly insidious because crowds using these places are often distracted by the venue event, reducing their situational awareness of their immediate environment. The Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places are intended to increase understanding of the threat that active armed offender incidents pose in crowded places. The Guidelines seek to illustrate the key role that owners and operators of crowded places can play in developing and implementing appropriately informed prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements to reduce the risks posed by such a threat. The guidance material has been developed by the 'Crowded Places Advisory Group' (CPAG) on behalf of the Australia-New Zealand Counter - Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC). It should be read in conjunction with Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism; Improvised Explosive Device Guidelines for Crowded Places, Chemical Weapon Guidelines and the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guidelines for Crowded Places. Purpose These Guidelines aim to increase the awareness of owners and operators of crowded places of the dynamic terrorism threat, while providing guidance on the issues and options which can be considered during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. These Guidelines set out several broad guiding principles which public and private sector stakeholders should consider to reduce the vulnerability of their site to the threat of terrorism. The Guidelines aim to supplement and build upon some of those broad areas of focus, with particular emphasis on the following two principles: - Prevention and preparedness arrangements should be underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach. - Effective security outcomes in complex crowded place environments require cooperation and coordination among stakeholders. Gaining a better understanding of the risk environment, and options for preventing and dealing with active armed offender incidents, will enable owners and operators in the private sector in particular to more effectively contribute to the collective national efforts to manage the active armed offender threat to crowded places. It is intended that this knowledge will lead to the development of 'contingency plans' or sub-plans to supplement existing emergency response plans and arrangements at facilities and venues. Details: Canberra, Australia: 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/active-armed-offender-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/active-armed-offender-guidelines-for-crowded-places.aspx Shelf Number: 154371 Keywords: Active Armed OffenderAustraliaCounterterrorismCrowded PlacesCrowded Places Advisory GroupEntertainment VenuesEvent SecurityNew ZealandRadicalizationRisky FacilitiesSporting StadiumsTerrorismTerrorist AttacksVenue Security |
Author: Gichanga, Margaret W. Title: Securing the Theatre for Champions: Special Events Security of the Private Security Sector in South Africa Summary: The primary objectives of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSiRA) are to regulate the private security industry and to exercise effective control over the practice of the occupation of security service provider in the public and national interest and in the interest of the private security industry itself. The Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act, No. 2 of 2010 (SASREA) sets out to ensure the safety of people attending events, as well as their property. The enactment of SASREA is largely in response to incidents that have taken place in which spectators were injured or killed. Important to note is that the SASREA does not work in isolation and local authorities play a pivotal role in this process. Special events security also has a public relations component and the success of special events has a lot to do with being conscious of the client's needs. Special events security differs drastically from usual security guarding and entails not only the protection of property but also the protection of delegates and guests. Hence, there is a bigger emphasis on the customer and being able to handle vital risks. This requires higher quality standards and a special events security officer needs to be able to think on their feet. PSiRA was not viewed as an important stakeholder when SASREA was being promulgated in parliament, and was barely consulted during the drafting process. This arguably created a lapse in awareness of and compliance with PSiRA regulatory principles. Notwithstanding this lacuna, the PSiRA legislation continues to be relevant for this aspect of security provision and its enforcement is applied without exception. This is despite a distinct emphasis of the importance of private security actors and their regulation within the SASREA regulations. Some provisions in the SASREA regulations are not comprehensively enforced. The lack of physical training for special events security is highlighted as a major shortcoming, as visiting a classroom would not enable a special events security officer to know how to deal with large crowds. Internal measures that must take root within the Authority are linked to the curbing of identity fraud and enhancing coordination with all relevant stakeholders related to the special events sector. For the most part, the South African special events sector of the private security industry can be described as being professional. The sector is one that employs thorough planning prior to events; this has led to clear and distinct communication routes. The hosting of major international and domestic sports and recreational events around the country without any major security lapses demonstrates the measures in place to integrate checks and balances for special events. However, room for improvement still exists, particularly as far as the involvement of the private security industry and its regulation is concerned. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 17, 2019 at: https://www.psira.co.za/psira/dmdocuments/research/PSIRA%20Special%20Events%20Research%20Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: South Africa URL: https://www.psira.co.za/psira/index.php/publications/research Shelf Number: 155000 Keywords: Event Security Private Security Industry Special Events Security Sporting Events Venue Security |